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THE 1990 NELPI ENERGY LAW ESSAY

LESSEE DUTIES AND LESSOR RIGHTS IN GAS
CONTRACTING UNDER THE IMPLIED
MARKETING COVENANT OF OIL, GAS, AND
MINERAL LEASES*
Roger D. Williamst

I.

INTRODUCTION

The domestic gas market underwent radical changes in the 1980's,
especially in the area of gas purchase contracts. 1 Interstate gas pipeline
companies began adjusting contracting practices to meet the often divergent objectives of their customers: downstream purchasers desire a reliable source of gas to satisfy peak demands over the long term, yet they
want contract flexibility to avail themselves of more favorable near-term
gas prices dictated by market forces.2 Recent gas purchase contracts
often contain price redetermination clauses and are generally of much
shorter duration than older long-term contracts, 3 forcing gas producers
and lessees to negotiate more frequently for the sale of natural gas.'
This changed gas contracting environment is primarily a product of
de-evolution in the gas regulatory scheme. The phased return to a partially free market in the gas industry under the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 (NGPA)5 is eliminating the traditional method of marketing gas,
* Winning Essay of the Fourteenth Annual National Energy Law and Policy Institute
Energy Law Essay Competition.
t J.D., 1991, University of Alabama School of Law. B.E. 1979, Vanderbilt University. M.S.,
1988, Tulane University. Associate, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D.C.
1. Pearson & Dancy, Negotiating and Renegotiating the Gas Contract: Producer Duties to
Third Parties, 56 OKLA. B.J. 2181, 2181 (1985).
2. Interview with John C. Griffin, Assistant Secretary for Southern Natural Gas Co., Birmingham, Alabama (Sept. 21, 1989).
3. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2181.
4. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2182.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988).
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developed under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA).6
Historically, gas pipeline companies acted as purchasers, transporters, and marketers of gas. They would execute long-term purchase contracts with gas producers, usually for a flat price, or with only nominal
price escalations over the contract term.7 A lessee-producer, by executing a long-term contract, typically satisfied its lease marketing obligations for the duration of the contract term. Pipeline companies, via
"take-or-pay" clauses, often guaranteed to take a minimum daily or
monthly quantity of gas, or pay the producer its equivalent price.8 The
pipelines therefore accepted the risks of transporting gas and handling
day-to-day market fluctuations based on end-users' needs. In exchange
for these "middleman" services, pipeline companies profited from builtin economies of scale.
This historical gas contracting pattern began to change in the early
1980's. A drilling boom in the oil and gas industry, fueled in part by the
NGPA's move toward a free gas market, combined with consumer conservation efforts, quickly led to a situation of gas oversupply. Gas prices
fell and long-term contract "take-or-pay" provisions became a major liability to pipeline companies who could not take and sell even their minimum gas contract volumes.9 The pipelines therefore began
concentrating more on their role as transporters, while leaving the marketing or merchant function to others. 10 The outcome is a change from
traditional long-term sales to pipeline companies to short-term direct
sales to gas marketing companies and gas brokers or consumers, often
with primary terms of only thirty days."
The purpose of this Article is to examine lessee duties and lessor
rights under the implied marketing covenant of oil and gas leases, specifically as they relate to gas contracting, and to assess the applicability of
established common-law principles to the new generation of gas contracts. Whereas under traditional long-term contracts a lessee could be
relatively unconcerned about subsequent marketing duties owed lessors,
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1988).
7. See, eg., Pineywoods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957, 975 (S.D.
Miss. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005
(1985).
8. See 4 H. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 724.5 (1989) [hereinafter OIL AND
GAS LAW].

9. See, e.g., SONAT, INC., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1989).
10. R. LUETrGEN, DraftingNaturalGas Contractsafter Order436: The Producer'sPerspective,
NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SECTION MONOGRAPH SERIES

(ABA) No. 11, at 1 (1989).
11. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2181.
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in today's gas market "contracting activities which do not consider the
obligations to the parties could result in the producer being held liable
for damages for breach of the implied covenant to market the gas." 2
Potential liability may also arise under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders designed to promote a free market for gas. 3 Finally, rules of law developed in litigation of long-term gas contracts may
be no longer relevant or may be more stringently applied, as contracting
frequency increases, exposing lessees to potentially greater liability.
II.

ORIGIN OF THE IMPLIED MARKETING COVENANT

The relationship between lessor and lessee in the development of oil,
gas, and mineral leases has been the subject of extensive litigation
throughout the history of oil and gas development. Judicial resolution of
disputes has affected lessor-lessee rights and obligations in two very significant ways: First, highly complex and technical lease provisions
(which generally tend to favor lessees) have evolved specifically delineating lessor rights and lessee obligations. A second, counterbalancing effect of judicial intervention in oil and gas leasing has been the
development of the law of implied covenants.
Because the highly complex nature of the lease contract, in many
situations, leases predominantly have become adhesion contracts. This
inequity results because most landowners possess very little knowledge of
oil and gas operations and possess relatively minor bargaining power in
negotiating lease terms. Large-scale landowners and corporate owners of
vast mineral interests, such as paper companies with extensive timber
and mineral holdings, usually retain experienced legal counsel to prepare
and negotiate oil and gas leases. But the majority of smaller land and
mineral interest owners typically acquiesce to the oil company's or landsman's lease form and terms. Should a conflict arise, the smaller mineral
interest owner will likely be dismayed to learn the disputed lease provision has a prior judicial stamp of approval.
The creation of implied covenants, however, offsets the unequal bargaining power of the lessee. Historically, oil and gas leases have been
intentionally silent as to important lessor rights and lessee obligations
12. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2181.
13. See Pierce, Lessor/Lessee Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX'N § 8.04 (1987) (under FERC Order No. 451, lessee may be liable to either of two lessors,
one with a low vintage/low price contract and the other with a multi-vintage/higher price contract,
whether electing or not electing to renegotiate the lower price contract).
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after oil and gas is first discovered.14 In part due to the adhesive nature
of the leases, and in part due to the principle of cooperation,1 5 courts
have incorporated implied covenants into leases. 16 Implied covenants
may be viewed as obligations derived by implication from the lease,
whether implied in fact based on the intention of the parties, 17 or implied
in law to do justice."'
Pertinent to the development of implied covenants is the implied

marketing covenant, now recognized as an accepted tenet of oil and gas
law. 19 The implied marketing covenant requires a lessee to use due diligence to market products capable of being produced from the leasehold

once they have been discovered. 20 While inconsistent lease provisions
may displace implied covenants,21 absent such provisions an implied covenant to market arises under any lease in which royalty is based on
value.

22

The implied covenant to market has become the basis for determining rights of lessors and obligations of lessees in gas contracting. In assessing these rights and obligations, one must keep in mind that
marketing gas is more difficult than marketing oil or other liquid products, primarily because of the required transportation infrastructure and
the impracticability of above-ground storage. To evaluate whether a
14. See 5 OIL AND GAS LAW § 801 supra note 8.
15. Id. Prof. Williams and Dean Meyers state that "[t]he principle of cooperation requires that
parties to a contract cooperate in order to carry out the purposes of the agreement. It is based upon
both the reasonable expectations of the parties when they enter into an agreement and ethical concepts of conduct." Id. § 802.1, at 9.
16. See Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936); lams v.
Carnegie Natural Gas, 194 Pa. 72, 45 A. 54 (1899).
17. See, eg., Walker, The Nature of the PropertyInterests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in
Texas, 11 TEx. L. REV. 399. 402 (1933).
18. M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES,

§§

7, 220 (2d ed. 1940 &

Supp. 1964).
19. 34 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 15.03[3] (1988).
20. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 933, 938 (10th Cir. 1971); Wolfe v. Texas Co.,
83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936); 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 8, § 853,
at 389.
21. 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 8, § 858, at 418.
22. 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 8, § 853, at 389. Professor Williams and Dean Meyers
suggest that the implied covenant to market also arises under leases providing for royalty payable in
kind because "the typical lessor lacks both the experience and facilities to dispose of the [products]
.... 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 8, § 853, at 394. Practically speaking, however, the lessor is
usually given the option to take royalty in value or in kind. The lessor who decides to take royalty in
kind, therefore, does so with full knowledge that it must provide necessary facilities to take the
products, and that this action releases the lessee from any express or implied duty to market the
lessor's royalty share of production. This Article adopts the view that the implied covenant to market arises only where a lessor receives royalty in value.
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lessee has breached its marketing duties, several factors need to be considered. They include the availability of a market,2 3 availability of marketing facilities (treating and processing plants), the pressure and quality
of gas, and the prevailing gas market price if a price exists.24

III. PRUDENT OPERATOR STANDARD AND LESSEE DUTIES IN
MARKETING
Courts in most states apply the prudent operator standard to determine whether a lessee has breached an implied covenant, including the
implied covenant to market. 25 The prudent operator standard has been
stated as "[w]hatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interest of
both lessor and lessee .... 26 It is an objective standard, analogous to
the reasonable person standard of negligence law.2
Courts impose various duties upon lessees under the implied marketing covenant based on the prudent operator standard. Depending on
the facts and circumstances, a lessee must fulfill certain obligations when
marketing a lessor's royalty share of gas. This section examines four possible duties which courts may impose on prudent operators or lessees.
Although often treated as separate and distinct standards, in reality these
duties are simply manifestations of the general duty to market. The four
standards include the duty to market in good faith, the duty to act as a
fiduciary, the duty to contract at 28arm's length, and the duty to obtain the
highest price in gas contracting.
A.

Duty to Market in Good Faith

Courts appear to focus primarily on the good-faith aspect of marketing when deciding whether a lessee has breached the implied covenant to
market, particularly in the area of gas contracting. Good faith is a lower,
23. The availability of a market includes such factors as the demand for gas, distance to existing
pipelines and distribution networks, and the relative cost of extending pipelines to the field. See 5
OIL AND GAs LAW, supra note 8, § 855, at 400.
24. See 2 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 415 (1954); 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supra
note 8, § 853, at 389; H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 546-47 (7th ed. 1987)
[hereinafter OIL AND GAS TERMS].
25. See Tidelands Royalty B Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 611 F. Supp. 795, 801 (N.D. Tex. 1985); 5
OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 8, § 806.3, at 35, § 856.3, at 407.
26. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
27. 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 8, § 806.3, at 42.
28. Section IV addresses another potential duty of a prudent operator under the implied marketing covenant, that of renegotiating existing gas contracts.
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subjective standard, which differs from the prudent operator standard.29
Good faith implies that a lessee has not acted fraudulently or dishonestly
in the exercise of its business judgment.30 In marketing, good faith implies that a lessee has not gained selfish advantage at the lessor's ex-

pense.3 ' In essence, the standard of good faith is subsumed in the
32
prudent operator standard.
The leading case dealing with breach of the implied covenant to
market in good faith is Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of
Pyote.33 In this case, the lessee, Amoco, committed the plaintiff-lessor's
gas to a sales contract on terms substantially lower than terms for which
34
gas was then being sold to other purchasers from the same well.
Amoco made this commitment by amending an existing gas contract

covering other Amoco leases in the unit with lessors other than the plaintiffs. 35 By doing so, Amoco obtained the collateral benefit of a four-fold

increase in price for the other lessors' gas previously committed to the
contract.3 6 The court held that Amoco breached its implied covenant by

failing to exercise good faith in marketing the plaintiff-lessor's gas at fair
market value under a lease providing for royalty based on proceeds. 37

The court stated, "justice toward the lessor would seem to require that he
29. Martin, A Modem Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market under MineralLeases, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 177 (1976). The difference between good faith and
the normal prudent operator test is that even though a lessee believes it acted in good faith and there
is a reasonable basis for this belief, a jury may still find the lessee failed to act as a prudent operator.
Id. at 199.
30. See 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supranote 8,§ 806.2, at 31-32 (quoting Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905)). See also infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
31. 5 OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 8, § 807, at 49.
32. Some courts have held that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
every contract. See Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1985);
Candelaria Indus., Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 662 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (D. Nev. 1987)
(court's statement of subsequent proceedings).
33. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d
610 (rex. 1980).
34. Id. at 282-83.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 284-87. Most oil and gas leases provide for gas royalties to be paid on either "proceeds" from the sale of gas, computed at the mouth of the well, or "market value" at the mouth of
the well. The "proceeds" clause applies when a lessee makes a wellhead sale of gas. The market
value provision is usually applicable whenever gas is used by the lessee off the leased premises or in
the manufacture of gasoline or other liquid products. The purpose of the "market value" clause is to
ensure that the lessor receives royalties based on fair market price, and not at some artificial price
determined by the lessee, whenever the lessee does not truly sell the gas stream, but uses it for fuel off
the leased premises or as a raw material to make more valuable products. See 3 OIL AND GAS LAW,
supra note 8,§§ 650-6.504.
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should receive the same return as those who had leased to other operators ...."38 In effect, the court found that Amoco's self-dealing was
"using" the plaintiff-lessor's gas within the spirit of the market value royalty clause,39 but failing to pay true market value. The Texas Court of
Appeals further explained the duty to market in good faith in El Paso
NaturalGas v. American Petrofina.4 Citing Amoco, the court stated that
"the duty to market in good faith is based on the assumption that the
operator [or lessee] is marketing something that belongs to the [lessor]." 41 It is a breach of good faith for the lessee to retain some benefit
that should rightfully be included in the benefit obtained for the lessor.
Whether an operator has marketed gas prudently and in good faith
is a factual issue for the trier of fact to evaluate in light of the circumstances existing at the time marketing occurred. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals so held in Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp.,42 a
case in which a lessor claimed that lessees and plant operators in
Oklahoma's Ringwood Field entered into unconscionable, confiscatory,
and unreasonable gas purchase contracts. Lessee Warren Petroleum had
several oil wells in the field that produced casinghead gas.43 At the time,
casinghead gas was an unwanted by-product of more valuable oil production.44 Producers typically wasted the gas by venting, or allowing it to
escape into the atmosphere, although the practice was illegal. 45 Faced
with the possibility of a complete field shutdown by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission if venting of gas continued,' lessee Warren Petroleum approached several companies who reputedly had the financial
capacity to build gathering and marketing facilities, and proposed to sell
the gas to them.4 7 Although neither Warren nor the potential gas marketers thought the project financially sound, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.,
a public utility, agreed to build the necessary facilities and market the
38. Amoco, 579 S.W.2d at 285 (quoting COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES, supra

note 18, § 84, at 212-14).
39. See supra note 30.
40. 733 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 550.
42. 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
43. Id. at 65-66. Casinghead gas is gas produced along with oil from oil wells. Typically, oil is
a more desired product. Casinghead gas may be separated from the oil in a primary separator, or
taken directly from the annular space between the casing and tubing string of the well. OIL AND
GAS TERMS, supra note 24, at 120.
44. Greenshields, 248 F.2d at 66.
45. Id.
46. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission had the power to order a complete shutdown of
wells venting gas in order to prevent waste. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 236-238 (1950).
47. Greenshields, 248 F.2d at 66.
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gas.48 Warren contracted to sell the gas to Oklahoma Natural at one and
one-half to two and one-half cents per Mcf.4 9
The basis of the plaintiff-lessor's claim was that Oklahoma Natural
paid ten cents per Mcf for "pipeline-quality gas" elsewhere in the state of
Oklahoma." The trial court, however, found that the low price for
Ringwood Field gas was justified." The gas was produced at low pressure and had to be treated for removal of liquid components and compressed to higher pressure in order to transport it to market via high
pressure pipeline.5 2 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding that the lessees acted in good faith and used due diligence
in marketing the gas. 3 The court stated that such a finding must be
explored by considering the circumstances existing at the time of marketing. 4 It seemed apparent to the court that the lessees could not have
obtained more favorable terms. The court further stated:
The mere fact that, due to the quality of the gas and the necessity for
obtaining an immediate market for gas then being wasted, the purchasers were in an excellent position to bargain for a low purchase price
cannot create a situation where the lessees would be liable to suit by
the lessors whether they entered the only available contract or refused
to enter it, provided they used diligence in promoting the lessors'
interests.55
The Amoco and Greenshields decisions thus provide important, basic
boundaries for defining and evaluating lessee duties and lessor rights in
gas contracting. A lessee has a duty to use good faith and due diligence
in marketing the lessor's gas in the manner of a reasonably prudent operator. Good faith and due diligence will be evaluated in light of circumstances existing at the time of marketing. A key factor in this analysis is
whether the lessee obtained some collateral benefit for itself at the lessor's
expense. Also, the fact that a lessee faced difficulty in marketing, due to
poor gas quality or even general market forces, standing alone, will not
48. Id.
49. Id. at 66 n.3. "Mcf" denotes 1000 cubic feet, the common measurement unit of gas in the
oil and gas industry, usually measured at a standard pressure and temperature datum. See OIL AND
GAS TERMS, supra note 24, at 552.
50. Id. at 68. Pipeline-quality gas "has sufficient pressure to enter the high pressure lines of the
purchaser for distribution to its customers without further compression and which is sufficiently dry
so that the liquid hydrocarbons therefrom will not drop out in the transmission lines." OIL AND
GAS TERMS, surpa note 24, at 720 (citing Greenshields).
51.

Greenshields,248 F.2d at 66.

52. Id. at 68.
53. Id. 67.

54. Id. at 67.
55. Id. at 69.
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subject the lessee to liability so long as the lessee used diligence to market
the gas.
B. Duty to Act as Fiduciary
The implied marketing covenant does not impose upon a lessee a
fiduciary duty to the lessor. 6 In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. American
Petrofina Co. of Texas," the defendants had assigned several leases to El
Paso Natural Gas Company, retaining overriding royalty interests in the
leases. El Paso drilled and produced wells on the leases for many years,
paying overriding royalties in accordance with the terms of lease assignments, styled "Gas Lease-Sales Agreements" (GLA's). El Paso also operated other leases in the area. A key provision in the defendants'
GLA's, negotiated prior to enactment of the NGPA in 1978, required El
Paso to pay overriding royalties upon the highest amount for which El
Paso could lawfully sell gas produced from any of its leases. By the early
1980's, El Paso was paying overriding royalties to the defendants at the
maximum price fixed by section 102 of the NGPA.5 8 This price was up
to four times the maximum price El Paso could charge for gas sold from
the defendants' GLA leases.5 9 In some cases, El Paso was paying more
in overriding royalties for GLA leases than it actually received from gas
sales.
Because of the unprofitability of the GLA leases, El Paso tendered
reassignments of the leases to the defendants pursuant to express unprofitability clauses in the GLA's. When all of the defendants refused to
accept El Paso's tenders, El Paso filed for a declaratory judgment as to its
rights and duties under the GLA's, and sought monetary damages. The
defendants pleaded affirmative defenses, and also sought a declaratory
judgment of their rights in the lease assignments. Basically, the defendants claimed that El Paso breached the implied covenant to market gas in
good faith by not selling gas produced from the GLA wells "for a sufficient price to prevent the wells from being unprofitable and, therefore,
reassignable."
56. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 933, 938 (10th Cir. 1971). See Townsend v.
Creekmore-Rooney Co., 332 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1958).
57. 733 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.-Houston 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. The NGPA established eight different categories of gas production and fixed maximum
lawful prices for the "first sale" of gas in each category. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982). Section 102
established ceiling prices for "new natural gas," as defined in the act. Id. § 3312(c).
59. Almost all of El Paso's GLA wells were either NGPA Section 103 or Section 104 wells. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 733 S.W.2d at 546.
60. Id at 550.
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The court held that El Paso did not owe the defendants any implied
duty as to the amount for which it actually sold their production, since
El Paso paid overriding royalties on an independently established higher
price. A working interest owner is not under an obligation to market gas
for a sufficient price to keep a lease assignment in effect when the alternative is to return 100% of the gas to the royalty owners.6 In dicta, the
court went on to say that "[i]f there were an implied duty to market in
good faith, it did not create a fiduciary duty on El Paso by which it was
obligated to subordinate its own interests to those of the defendants."6 2
This reasoning should logically also apply to lessee-lessor relationships
since they are essentially the same as that of assignee-assignor in El Paso
Natural Gas.
A lessee may therefore diligently promote its own interests in marketing gas, without fear of being held to a fiduciary standard of conduct,
so long as the lessor's interests coincide with the lessee's. However,
where a lessee's interests are not aligned with those of its lessor, as where
a lessee sells gas to an affiliate or to a wholly or partially owned subsidiary, the lessee may be held to a stricter standard than the prudent operator standard. In this situation "the court may be more willing to 'second
guess' the marketing decisions of the lessee."6 3 Stated another way,
courts will be more likely to strictly scrutinize a lessee's intent and motive in gas contracting when the lessee's interests are antagonistic to
those of its lessor." Often, this is referred to as a duty to contract at
arm's length.
C. Duty to Contractat Arm's Length
Arguably, all gas purchase contracts should be negotiated at arm's
length. Under the implied marketing covenant, this may be viewed as
another aspect of a prudent operator's obligations; however, it becomes
an explicit duty where a lessee contracts with a subsidiary or affiliated
company, or where a lessee's interests are otherwise antagonistic to those
of its lessor. The obvious problem is one of collusion 6" on price and
61. Id.
62. Id
63. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2183.
64. Pearson & Dancy suggest six different situations where antagonism between lessee and lessor may arise, three of which are directly related to gas contracting. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1,
at 2182.
65. Collusion is not necessarily limited to dealings between a lessee and its affiliated or subsidiary companies, but may arise between independent entities. In the latter case, a lessor may bring a
cause of action under the implied covenant to market just as with the former; however, allegations of
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terms, with the lessee attempting to pay gas royalties under the "proceeds" royalty clause to the detriment of the lessor.66 A lessee typically
claims that it is only obligated to pay royalties on the proceeds of its
contract (which are usually below market value), whereas the lessor
claims it is entitled to royalties under the "market value" royalty clause
based on gas market price at the time the gas is sold.
In the leading case of Tyson v. Surf Oil Co.,67 a lessee sold gas to
three affiliated companies at one cent per Mcf, while the market price
was four cents per Mcf. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the
principal of the lessee, Mr. C. M. Leonard, was the "moving spirit" of all
three affiliated companies, and that he fixed the price which the affiliated
companies would pay for the gas. 8 Therefore, the court held that the
plaintiff-lessors were entitled to fair market value for the gas at the well
because they did not consent to the gas sales price.
The Tyson court imposed a stricter standard upon the lessee, a standard which requires a lessee to obtain the lessor's approval of the gas
sales price whenever contracting with an affiliate or subsidiary. Failure
to obtain the lessor's approval is apparently prima facie evidence of failing to contract at arm's length, at least in the context of lessee-affiliate
gas contracting in Louisiana.
More recently, Texas courts have been willing to adopt a less strict
standard than that of Tyson. In Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen,6 9 several royalty owners brought an action against their gas lessee based on
breach of contract, failure to market gas with good faith and reasonable
diligence, and fraud by misrepresentation and concealment. Texas Oil &
Gas (TXO) contracted to sell the plaintiffs' royalty share of gas to Delhi
Pipeline Company, TXO's wholly owned subsidiary. Delhi transported
the gas to a central dehydration facility in the field, then transported the
gas seven and one-half miles to a gas treating plant. After treating, Delhi
transported the gas to two end-line users fifty and one hundred miles
away. These end-line users paid fifteen cents per Mcf more than the
price provided in the TXO-Delhi contract. TXO paid the plaintiffs royalties based on the lower-price in the TXO-Delhi contract.
collusion or fraud should be pleaded in order for the court to apply a stricter level of review as to the
intent and motives of the lessee. See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
67. 196 So. 336 (1940).
68. Tyson, 196 So. at 339.
69. 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984), case settled, judgment set aside, 760 S.W.2d
960 (Tex. 1988).
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The plaintiffs claimed that because Delhi was a subsidiary of TXO,
gas was not actually sold at the wells, but "sold or used off the premises"
by TXO. Based on proof that the subsidiary was merely the alter ego of
its parent company, the court disregarded the purported sale of gas at the
wells and found that the true sale was off the premises. The court found
the evidence insufficient to create a presumption of arm's-length contracting and held that the sale of gas by the lessee to its wholly owned
subsidiary was a sham. Therefore, the market value royalty clause was
operative, and not the proceeds royalty clause.7 0
Although the Hagen court found the gas contract to be a sham, it
did acknowledge that, under proper circumstances, a presumption of
arm's-length contracting could be sustained:
The mere fact that a subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent and
there is an identity of management does not justify disregarding the
corporate entity of the subsidiary, but where management and operations are assimilated to the extent that the subsidiary is simply a name
or a conduit through which the parent conducts its business, the corporate fiction may be disregarded in order to prevent fraud and
*
71
injustice.
Even though the judgment in Hagen was set aside by the Texas
Supreme Court based on a settlement reached by the parties, 72 and therefore has no precedential value, it is still illustrative of the recent intellectual climate of the Texas Court of Appeals.
The proper circumstances alluded to in Hagen were in fact
presented to the Texas Court of Appeals two years later in Parkerv. TXO
Production Corp.7 3 Parker involved a suit by royalty owners for breach
of the implied covenant to market gas in good faith. The lessee sold gas
to its wholly owned subsidiary at ninety-five percent of market value,
deducting five percent for compression charges, even though other prospective purchasers made no similar deduction. 74 The court held there
was no basis for piercing the lessee's corporate veil to determine if the
sale was a sham. 75 Therefore, if contract gas sales price is found to be
70. See supra note 37.
71. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d at 28 (citing Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 571
(Tex. 1975), and Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp. 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968)).
72. 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988).
73. 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
74. Id. at 645. "The court indicates that factors other than price can validly be considered in
determining whether gas has been properly marketed." Smith, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil
and Gas Law, 38 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N § 1.03[1][c][i], at 1-30 (1987). See discussion
concerning price in gas marketing, infra, Part III, Subpart D.
75. Parker,716 S.W.2d at 647-48.
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"close" to its market value price at the time the contract was negotiated,
the court will presume the contract was negotiated at arm's length and
the "proceeds" gas royalty clause will be operative.
The stricter standard of arm's-length contracting has also been
called a standard of "highest good faith." In Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith,7 6
gas lessors brought suit against lessee-assignee Le Cuno for an accounting of receipts for the sale of gas at the wellhead. Le Cuno, which also
owned the gas gathering system, took custody of gas at the wellhead,
processed it, and sold it to interstate gas pipeline companies. The court
noted that Le Cuno, as producer, could have contracted with Le Cuno,
as gatherer, to effectively set gas prices." Because Le Cuno accounted to
its lessors based on wellhead price, it was required to "exercise the highest good faith in any contract it entered disposing of the royalty owners'
gas." 78 But finding that Le Cuno's sales to the interstate pipelines were
bona fide arm's-length transactions, the court held that Le Cuno satisfied
the highest good faith standard.79
Apparently, the Le Cuno court would impose an arm's-length or
highest good faith standard on all wellhead gas sales where the lessee, or
its subsidiary or affiliate, owns or operates downstream gathering, treating, or pipeline facilities. Under these circumstances, if a lessor challenges a wellhead gas sale as being below market value, the court will
presume that the gas contract between a lessee and its subsidiary or affiliate is not at arm's length. The burden of proof will shift to the lessee to
show by circumstantial evidence that its gas contract price was close to
market value at the time the contract was executed.
D. Duty to Obtain Best Price in Gas Contracting- Lessee's Exercise of
Good Business Judgment
Under the implied marketing covenant, courts generally have given
deference to the business judgment of a lessee in marketing gas. For example, in Gazin v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,80 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that a lessee exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining a satisfactory market for gas within a reasonable time even
though a less satisfactory market was available three and one-half years
76. 306 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
974 (1958).
77. Id at 192.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 192-93.
80. 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1962).
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earlier. The lessee gambled by drilling additional wells, proving up more
reserves, in order to secure a gas contract with better prices and terms."1
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached an opposite conclusion in Hutchinson v. McCue.82 The court disagreed with the lessee's
business judgment in suspending deliveries to an existing gas market in
an effort to obtain a better price. The court may have been influenced by
the fact that gas was already being sold in an existing market, and that
the lessor had a vested interest in the continuation of those sales as a
83
third-party beneficiary to an existing contract.
Gdzin and Hutchinson illustrate the dilemma facing lessees who are
forced to choose between contracting to sell gas for a presently available
low price, or withholding their gas in anticipation of receiving a higher
price later. 4 Commentators have clouded lessees' business decisions by
stating that a lessee owes a duty to its lessor to obtain the best price and
terms possible for gas.85
Several courts have examined the relationship between lessee and
lessor in the context of whether a lessee has a duty to obtain the best
price and terms when entering into gas contracts. For example, in
Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote,"6 the court reviewed several authorities who advocated a duty under the implied marketing covenant for a lessee to obtain the highest price available when
marketing gas. While the court's opinion gives tacit approval to this
view, the court did not expressly endorse it.
Some opinions have been cited as creating a duty for a lessee to
obtain the highest price available when marketing gas, but a closer examination of these opinions and the authorities upon which they rely indicates otherwise. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Johnson
81. Id. at 1011.
82. 101 F.2d II1 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 308 U.S. 564 (1939).
83. See infra Part V for a discussion of lessors' rights as third-party beneficiaries to gas
contracts.
84. See Discussion Notes, 16 Oil & Gas Rep. 1014 (1962).
85. See, e.g., COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES, supra note 18, § 84, at 212-14

("the concept of diligence in marketing should include the duty to realize the highest price obtainable by the exercise of reasonable effort"); Martin, supra note 29, at 191 (there is a duty owed by
lessee to obtain the best price possible for gas); Siefkin, Rights of Lessor and Lessee with Respect to
Sale of Gas and as to Gas Royalty Provisions, 4 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 181, 182 (1953)
(implied obligation to market probably requires the lessee to secure the highest price reasonably
obtainable).
86. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 611 S.W. 2d
610 (Tex. 1980).
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v. Jernigan17 stated that "[t]he lessee is obligated to develop the commodity he has found so that it will bring the highest possible market
value,"8 8 citing the opinion in Hardingv. Cameron.8 9 The Hardingcourt
had stated that "[a]n implied duty or obligation was imposed by law...
to obtain a market for the gas at the best price obtainable,"' citing as
authority for this statement the decisions of Gazin v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.9 and Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co. 92 Neither Gazin
nor Townsend, however, directly support the Harding statement.
The Harding court apparently read Gazin as saying that the lessee
did not breach its implied covenant to market by waiting three and onehalf years to enter into a gas purchase contract because the covenant
included the obligation to market gas at the best possible price obtainable. But in Gazin the lessee's diligence in drilling additional wells while
seeking better contract terms appears to be the basis for the court's decision.9 3 Townsend only supports that an implied covenant to market exists, not that it requires marketing at the highest price possible.
Searching the "chain of title" for the Johnson and Harding opinions,
therefore, reveals very little support for a "duty" to market gas at the
best price and terms available.
More recently in Barby v. Cabot Corp.,94 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court expressly stated that "[u]nder Oklahoma law a producer has a
duty to market the gas produced from a well and to obtain the best price
and terms available,"" citing their decision in Tara Petroleum Corp. v.
Hughey.96 This statement represents an expansive interpretation of Tara
Petroleum. The Tara Petroleum court did not hold that a lessee has a
duty to obtain the best price in marketing gas, but that best price is prima
facie satisfaction of the lessee's royalty obligation under a "market value"
97
royalty clause.
Gas contract price and terms were also at issue in Piney Woods
87. 475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970).

88. Id. at 399.
89. 220 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1963).

90. Id. at 470.
91. 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961).
92. 358 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1960).
93. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
94. 550 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Okla. 1981). Barby involved a claim that a lessee breached its
implied covenant to market by waiting fourteen months after expiration of an existing gas contract
before executing a new contract. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of
proof in showing that the lessee was dilatory in renegotiating the expired contract. Id. at 191.
95. Id. at 190.
96. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
97. See id. at 1273.
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Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co." Plaintiff-lessors charged lessee,
Shell, with failure to fulfill its obligation to market gas because Shell did
not procure a price renegotiation clause in one of two gas sales contracts.
The first or "base" contract was executed in 1971 at a price of fifty-three
cents per Mcf, escalating three percent per year.99 The second or "excess" contract was negotiated and executed one year later at a price of
forty-five cents per Mcf, escalating one percent per year.10 The excess
contract also contained an "area FPC clause" which provided that Shell
would receive the Federal Power Commission's prescribed ceiling rate
for comparable gas sales in the area if that rate was higher than the contract rate. At the time of trial, gas was being sold for sixty-three cents
per Mcf under the base contract but for $1.63 per Mcf under the excess
contract due to the area FPC clause.10 1 The lessors objected to the absence of a similar clause in the base contract.
The court found that at the time Shell negotiated the base contract,
gas was customarily being sold under long-term contracts at fixed prices
with minimal price escalation clauses. 2 Therefore, the court held that
Shell did not breach its implied duty to market. 10 3 The fortuitous price
increase in the excess contract resulting from the area FPC clause was
immaterial, especially since the initial price and escalation rate of the
base contract were higher than in the excess contract.

According to testimony of Shell's regional marketing manager,
when negotiations initially began prices offered in the interstate market
were generally equal to, or slightly greater than, those found in the intrastate market.1 0 4 But intrastate gas sales yielded a higher present value
than interstate sales because the Federal Power Commission did not regulate production volumes.1 5 Shell therefore committed its gas to the
intrastate market early in the marketing process.
The district court did not address the reasonableness of Shell's decision to commit its gas to the intrastate market at a lower price than the
interstate market probably because the price for intrastate sales was
98. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
99. Id. at 229. The "base" contract covered sales of gas up to a maximum of 46,667 Mef per
day. Id.

100. Id. The "excess" contract covered sales of gas produced by Shell in excess of the amount
committed under the base contract. See id.
101. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957, 965-69.
102. Id. at 975.
103. Id.
104. Id at 966.
105. Shell's marketing occurred during the early 1970's, prior to enactment of the NGPA.
Under the NGA, only interstate gas sales were regulated. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
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higher by the time the base and excess contracts were executed. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affrming the district court's decision,
impliedly acknowledged that a prudent operator or lessee does not have
to market gas at the highest price obtainable, but may consider all relevant factors. Instead of accepting the terms of the base contract, the
court stated, "Shell might... have accepted a lower initial price but
reserved the opportunity to redetermine the price at later intervals ....
Shell's decision was not a breach of the lease-created covenant to market,
since the choice of the [base] contract was a prudent and reasonable
one."

10 6

Piney Woods illustrates an important facet of gas contracting, often
overlooked in the best-price-and-terms debate. A gas contract is not a
simple, single-purchase transaction where a known commodity is sold to
the highest bidder. Many complex, interrelated factors weigh heavily in
a lessee's marketing decisions, which arguably should enter into a court's
determination of whether a lessee breached its implied covenant to market where a lessee contracts to sell gas for less than "best" price. Courts
need to take a flexible approach in reviewing a lessee's business judgment.
Depending on business climate, market factors, and regulatory constraints, a lessee may attempt to negotiate a gas contract which yields the
highest present value, the highest actual value, or some optimization of
the two. Initial price is only one factor to be considered. With the current trend toward contracts of much shorter duration, however, price
may be the most important criterion.
IV.

DUTY TO RENEGOTIATE GAS CONTRACTS

This section analyzes whether a duty exists for a lessee to renegotiate gas contracts by considering two basic questions. First, does a general duty exist for a lessee-seller to renegotiate an existing, unexpired
contract with a gas purchaser whenever changed circumstances make
performance of the contract harsh or unreasonable? Second, whether or
not a general duty exists, does the implied marketing covenant impose a
duty upon a lessee to use due diligence, in the manner of a reasonably
prudent operator, to renegotiate an existing, unexpired gas contract when
it would be advantageous to the lessor's interests?
106. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 237.
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A.

Lessee's General Duty to Renegotiate a Gas Contract with the Gas
Purchaser

The parties to a contract are best able to assign and allocate risks
during contract formation. Contract renegotiation therefore represents a
reallocation of contract risks. However, where the parties expressly or
implicitly allocate risks associated with foreseeable contingencies in the
contract, courts will normally enforce the contract and will not later intervene to reallocate risks, unless failure to do so causes an unconscionable result.
In a fixed-price gas contract, the parties assign the risk of market
price increases to the lessee-seller and the risk of market price decreases
to the gas purchaser."0 7 The assignment of risk to a lessee-seller is comparatively less where the gas contract places a floor under price but allows for price escalation, 10 8 but the parties nevertheless explicitly allocate
risks. If a lessee-seller incorrectly forecasts future gas market changes
and finds itself locked into a disadvantageous contract, it cannot complain that the contract is unconscionable. All that can be said is that an
undesirable outcome has occurred in a risk-oriented business. 10 9 In this
situation a lessee-seller may attempt to assert the doctrines of impossibility or impracticability; however, these are "devices for shifting risk in
accordance with the parties' presumed intentions, which are to minimize
the costs of contract performance, one of which is the disutility created
by risk[.] [T]hey have no place when the contract explicitly assigns a
particular risk to one party or the other." 110
There is, therefore, no general duty for a lessee-seller or a gas purchaser to renegotiate an existing gas contract when a contingency related
to an explicitly assigned risk occurs. On the other hand, the implied
marketing covenant does impose a duty upon a lessee to renegotiate
where a gas contract has expired. For example, in Barby v. Cabot
Corp., 11 the court held that a lessee breached its marketing duty by failing to renegotiate an expired gas contract for twenty-one months. In
Amoco Production Co. v. FirstBaptist Church of Pyote,112 the court imposed a duty on a lessee to renegotiate an expired gas contract at a higher
107. See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
108. See id at 278.
109. See id.
110. Id.
I11. 550 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
112. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d
610 (Tex. 1980).
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price than that obtained by the lessee. The nature of the duty to renegotiate expired contracts is in fact nearly identical with the original duty to
market gas upon first discovery of commercial production. However, as
the decision in Barby suggests, courts may be less tolerant of time elapsed
13
in renegotiation settings.'
The existence of a duty to renegotiate expired gas contracts does not
create nor impose a similar duty upon a lessee to renegotiate existing,
unexpired contracts, even if the lessee later negotiates contracts for the
sale of other lessors' gas on more favorable terms. Subsequently-negotiated contracts could possibly be on less favorable terms, but a lessor
would assuredly not argue that its lessee would have a duty to renegotiate the gas contract in this situation.
While a lessee may desire to renegotiate its gas purchase contract
after learning of more favorable terms in later contracts its purchaser
negotiates with other parties, the lessee has no implied duty to do so
apart from an express renegotiation clause. Conversely, and perhaps
more importantly, the gas purchaser has no duty to renegotiate the original contract with the lessee-seller, absent an express renegotiation clause
or a judicially-mandated reformation.
B.

Lessee's Duty Under the Implied Marketing Covenant to Use Due
Diligence to Renegotiate a Gas Contract

An appropriate standard of review for gas contracting, as set forth
in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey,1 14 is that a gas contract is not unreasonable if fair and representative of other contracts negotiated at the time
in the field. A lessor, therefore, cannot complain that its lessee is in
breach of any lease obligation for failure to renegotiate a reasonable and
fair contract, even though it appears unreasonable and harsh based on
later, higher-priced contracts."-'
Given that a lessee has no general duty to renegotiate a gas contract,
113. Cf. Gazin v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1962) (3-1/2 years reasonable
time to market newly discovered gas). See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
114. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
115. A claim of "harshness" in gas contracting between a lessee and gas purchaser, based on
later unforeseen changes, has been reviewed but not accepted by at least one court, calling it a claim
for "imprevision." "This essentially French doctrine ... permits judicial reformation of contracts
whenever a drastic change in circumstances renders performance for one of the parties harsh .... "
Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. Ct. App. 1988). See Litvinoff, Force
Majeure, Failure of Cause and Theorie De L'Imprevision: Louisiana Law and Beyond, 46 LA. L.
REV. 1 (1985).
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it would be illogical to imply a duty to use due diligence to do so whenever a lessor learns that some other mineral interest owner is getting a
better bargain. Further, what would be the gas purchaser's incentive to
renegotiate prices upward? What consideration would a lessee-seller provide to obtain a higher-priced contract? When a lessee renegotiates for
higher prices by compromising prices or terms under other contracts, he
16
breaches the implied marketing covenant as related to other lessors.'
An allegation that a lessee failed to use due diligence in renegotiating an existing, fixed-price gas contract, where market prices have increased substantially, could possibly be viewed as a claim for breach of
the implied marketing covenant since the lessee failed to include a "price
renegotiation clause" in the contract. However, in Piney Woods Country
Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 117 the court held otherwise. The court found
that the lessee executed gas contracts for the best available prices at the
time, fulfilling its implied marketing duties. 118 Courts have consistently
refused to allow lessors to use hindsight in attacking gas contracts which
were reasonable when originally executed.
V.

LESSOR RIGHTS IN GAS CONTRACTING:

THE LESSOR A

THIRD-

PARTY BENEFICIARY

A review of lessee duties and lessor rights under the implied marketing covenant would not be complete without a brief discussion of what
appears to be an emerging basis for closer scrutiny of a lessee's gas contracting activities. Although a lessee is not under a duty to renegotiate a
gas contract at the bidding of its lessor, the lessee may have a duty to
obtain lessor approval where the lessee chooses to renegotiate an existing
valid gas contract. This possible duty may arise under a third-party beneficiary theory:
A third party beneficiary is one for whose benefit a promise is
made in a contract, but who is not a party to the contract. Royalty
and overriding royalty owners may be considered third party beneficiaries to a gas contract as they receive revenues and benefits predicated on the contract, but are not actually parties to it." 9
In effect, once a lessee enters into a gas contract with a purchaser,
116. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
117. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
118. Where a lessee does fail to include a price renegotiation clause and contracts for less than
the best available price, a lessor may have a stronger argument for breach of the implied marketing
covenant. See supra Part III, Subpart D.
119. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2185 (footnote omitted).
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the lessor becomes a creditor beneficiary12 ("The royalty obligation on
the sale of gas thus creates a contractual debtor/creditor relationship between the lessor and lessee.")."2 1 After the beneficiary's rights vest, the
contracting parties may need the beneficiary's approval to modify the
contract. 122
Logically, no lessor would object if the lessee renegotiates more
favorable prices and terms, but during periods of low demand and oversupply, the normally coincident interests of lessee and lessor may
diverge.
In some instances, the [lessee] may want to maximize its cash flow to
service its bank debt and pay operating expenses, thereby stabilizing its
financial position. The maximization of cash flow may come through
spot market sales at prices which may be considered below market
value if compared to the prices obtained under long term contracts
negotiated in better markets.
The lessor may not have a coinciding interest in maximizing cash
flow, and instead may desire12to
maximize the total returns from his
3
royalty and mineral interest.

A more predominant scenario, precipitated by the "gas bubble" and
downturn in gas prices in the early 1980's, is that pipelines and other gas
purchasers have refused to honor their contracts unless producers agreed
to lower prices and substantial modification of take-or-pay provisions.24
Professor Richard Pierce has categorized four responses a lessee might
make in this context:1 2 1 (1) a lessee may accede to the purchaser's demand in order to maintain some gas sales and cash flow, and to avoid
potential shut-in problems; (2) a lessee may hold out for a period of time
for more favorable terms and a possible settlement bonus; (3) a lessee, in
addition to holding out for more favorable terms and a possible settlement bonus, may obtain the collateral benefit of raising the contract price
applicable to a different source of supply; and, (4) a lessee may litigate to
a final judicial resolution of compensatory and/or exemplary damages, as
well as a declaratory judgment requiring future contract compliance.
While many cases between lessee-producers and gas purchasers have
120. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2186. A creditor beneficiary is a person, not a party to a
contract between promisor and promisee, to whom the promisee owes a duty. The promisee acts as
a conduit, i.e., the promisor's performance on the contract flows through the promisee to benefit the
promisee's creditor.
121. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2182.
122. See Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2186.
123. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2185.
124. Pierce, supra note 13, § 8.03.
125. Pierce, supra note 13, § 8.0311]-[4].
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been resolved,126 suits between lessors and lessees are likely germinating
in this litigiously fertile soil.
Whether a lessee chooses (for business reasons) or "elects" (based
on a purchaser's anticipatory breach) to renegotiate an existing valid gas
contract, the lessee may have a duty to inform or obtain lessor approval. 12 7 A very serious problem, however, is that a lessor whose financial goals differ from those of its lessee will have no incentive to approve
a proffered renegotiated contract. Or an unsophisticated lessor may be
bewildered at the lessee's request for approval, having never been privy
to the original contract. At the other extreme, a sophisticated lessor may
play a "hold up game" with its lessee to exact a substantial "approval
bonus" for agreeing not to sue for breach of contract under the implied
marketing covenant.
Clearly, a lessee needs some latitude to exercise good business judgment in marketing, especially in the current environment. Judicial expansion and clarification of third-party beneficiary principles, as applied
to implied marketing obligations, appears to be inevitable, and will likely
occur as more frequently negotiated short-term gas contracts are litigated. The same principles, however, should apply to contract renegotiations as apply to original contract negotiations.
A lessee does not stand as a fiduciary to its lessor and is not required
to subordinate its interests to those of its lessor. 2 8 If a lessee is held to a
standard of good faith and reasonable prudence in exercising its business
judgment when negotiating an original gas contract without obtaining
lessor approval, a lessee should be held to the same standard and have
the right to renegotiate its gas contract, when necessary in its business
judgment, without the burdensome and potentially complicated task of
obtaining lessor approval.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The new gas contracting environment will certainly influence evaluation of lessee duties and lessor rights under the implied marketing covenant, but clearly some principles of established law will not change. For
126. See, eg., Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. Ct. App. 1988);
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987). Cf
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
127. Pearson & Dancy, supra note 1, at 2188. Cf Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So.
336 (1940) (gas sold by lessee to affiliate for less than market price without lessor consent; price not
binding on lessor).
128. See supra Part III, Subpart B.
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example, the standard of review of a lessee's marketing activities will inevitably remain the same; a lessee has a duty to use good faith and due
diligence in marketing its lessor's gas in the manner of a reasonably prudent operator. Circumstances existing at the time of marketing should
continue to be relevant. Also, courts will still consider lessee dealings
with affiliates or subsidiaries as warranting stricter scrutiny of marketing
activities.
The trend to shorter-term, direct sales gas contracts, however, will
likely cause more stringent evaluation of whether a lessee contracted for
the best or highest possible price. With the proliferation of gas contract
brokers (both pipeline-atfiliated brokers and independent brokers) the gas
market may begin to resemble other commodities markets. Growing
"spot market" sales already evidence this trend. Price may indeed become the most important factor in determining whether a lessee has
acted prudently in marketing gas.
In one sense, increased contracting frequency may subject lessees to
greater liability under the implied marketing covenant, not only because
of the number of contracts negotiated, but also because of the potential
for courts to reconsider the relationship of lessee to lessor. Arguably, a
typical lessor's knowledge of gas contracting and bargaining power is
even less in today's market. Whereas a lessor may have been willing to
attempt to market its royalty share of gas for a long-term sale by seeking
professional counsel, a typical lessor in today's market does not have the
resources to effectively market its gas on a short-term or frequent basis. 129 More than ever, a lessor must rely on its lessee's business judgment and marketing acumen. A lessee essentially acts as the lessor's
agent in this setting, creating a stronger argument for a relationship of
trust.
On the other hand, greater contracting frequency may reduce lessee
liability for breach of the implied marketing covenant in some situations.
Because the contract term is much shorter, the potential compensatory
damages for breach will be limited, that is, if the questionable contract
represents only a temporary aberration. If the parties roll over the contracts month-to-month, however, they may establish a pattern of conduct, subjecting the lessee to greater liability and possibly even punitive
damages.
129. It is possible that gas brokers and marketers may fill the gap for lessors in this area. However, brokerage services are normally performed for a fee. Lessors may prefer to allow their lessees
to market gas, since marketing costs are often absorbed into a lessee's overhead and not deducted
from royalty.
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Short-term, frequent gas contracts may lessen some traditional concerns about seller-purchaser relationships and allocation of risks. In the
past a lessee might have acquiesced to certain contract terms in hopes of
establishing a better working relationship with a major gas pipeline-purchaser. The relationship between producer and seller was often confrontational, with the long-term arrangement usually benefitting one
130
party at the expense of the other party over the contract's duration.
Lessees also faced potential liability for errors in judgment in negotiating
contract terms and allocating risks. In a free market where gas is sold on
a short-term basis, however, the focus shifts to buying and selling the
commodity at market prices. The emphasis on maintaining long-term
relationships and drafting contracts to cover all possible contingencies is
no longer necessary.
Overall, the relaxed regulatory scheme and the move toward a free
gas market, with its attendant impact on gas contracting, should prove
beneficial to both lessor and lessee. Gas market prices and gas price futures may become topics of household conversation, much the same as
oil prices, and gas prices may be listed in the financial sections of daily
newspapers. Lessors may find they will be much more informed as to
their lessees' marketing activities by matching royalty payments with
published gas prices for the corresponding period of production. Lessees
may find they are less vulnerable to litigation since the complexities and
risks of gas contracting are apparently minimized in a competitive, shortterm market. If this is truly the result, then lessees may channel their
energies into more worthwhile endeavors-exploring for more oil, gas
and mineral resources.
130. R. LUETrGEN, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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